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A REVIEW OF MARTHA FINEMAN'S THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES: SHE THREW OUT THE BABY
WITH THE OLD FEMINISM
A Review Essay by Eleanor Willemsen*
and Michael Willemsent
In her provocative keynote address, Martha Fineman
presents us with a challenging proposal for thinking our way
out of the "welfare dilemma." She addresses the social
problems that stem from children growing up without resident fathers. These problems range from troubles in school,
increased aggressive behavior, and precocious sexuality to inadequate nutrition and medical care. Fineman urges us to
redefine the family as a "caregiving dyad," comprised of a dependent child (or other dependent person) and his or her
principal nurturer, who is most often the mother. This enables us to focus on our collective responsibility to this revised family, free from the notion that its needs are the private responsibility of the absent father. She points out that
caregiving and emotional nurturing are "gendered" activities
that are usually assigned to females in our society, thus causing them to become undervalued. The caregivers of dependents often depend on resources outside of their own domain
in order to provide the secure and nurturing setting that they
and their children need. Fineman proposes that we should
accept a collective responsibility for the derived dependency
of this caregiving dyad instead of assigning it to a biological
father who needs to be "brought back" into the family. We
must provide support for the family as she has redefined it.
Fineman seems to base her suggestions on two interrelated concerns. First, when we assign responsibility for the
* Professor of Psychology, Santa Clara University.
t Mr. Willemsen was a research attorney for the California Supreme
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nurture of the family to the father, we make the family's security a private matter which is based on the sexual bond between a man and woman. Our failure to see this child support as a public concern allows us to avoid subsidizing it. The
result has been that many single female caregivers and their
children are inadequately supported, by themselves or by society, and the problems of child poverty result. Children are
at risk because their opportunities for nurture and care come
from the sexual relationships that their principal nurturers
may or may not have with the child's biological father.
Threats to these sexual relationships are threats to child nurture. Finally, Fineman argues that, as a practical matter,
forcing biological fathers to take financial responsibility has
little potential to reverse child poverty. Because fathers of
children raised by single mothers are not able to provide the
needed resources to support them, child poverty will
continue.
Much of Fineman's paper goes beyond the practicalities
of how parents should nurture children, and instead focuses
on the impact that current welfare policies and reform proposals have on women. While this too merits discussion, our
concern is that the child's best interests will not be adequately addressed. We will carefully examine points of
Fineman's argument before developing an analysis of this
concern. We will look at her criticism of current feminist jurisprudence, explain her skepticism about the practical effects of making policy revolve around the father's role as a
provider, and restate her proposal for the circumstances
under which fathers should be assigned enforceable responsibilities for the nurture of their children.
Fineman notes much that is worthy of criticism in current feminist jurisprudence as it is applied to family law.
Feminist scholars focus on equality between men and women,
but the corresponding revisions in family law do not achieve
this equality. The "no fault" family law revisions made in recent years achieve greater sameness of treatment of men and
women. Men and women have equal access to contact with
the child, equal standing to petition for custody, equal obligation to provide support, and equal responsibility for ensuring
that the child has an opportunity to preserve a relationship
with the other parent. The scrupulous attention to treating
the mother and father the same may appear to be based on
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the presumption that they are equally important in children's
lives. However, it is instead based on a concern for equal
rights among men and women.
Fineman addresses the results of an equality-based feminist approach to child nurture issues. First, this new "no
fault" law retains traditional patriarchal notions of the family
as a private and provider-based social sphere based on the
sexual relationship between a man and woman who happen
to be parents. Admittedly, under current law there is a more
equal distribution of responsibility between the mother and
father within the traditional family structure. Second, "no
fault" law has done nothing to improve the welfare of
children. In fact, their situation has become worse. Finally,
child nurture continues to be regarded as a private matter,
and therefore remains outside the realm of public
responsibility.
Fineman's analysis of the points we have just identified
is organized around her central thesis: "no fault" family law,
based on the goal of treating men and women the same, damages women. This law retains the worst features of the patriarchal family. Namely, child nurture is a private matter and
those who provide economic support have control. Additionally, this law assigns women new burdens of economic responsibility. Women retain the traditional gendered responsibility of child nurture because there is little recognition in
the law for an equal duty of fathers to nurture their children.
Women continue to nurture children, but must now do it
without adequate provision for their derived economic
dependency.
Fineman asserts that present laws consider both the
mother's and the father's relationship with their children as
equally worthy of protection by the state. Preservation of this
equality is, however, more valuable than providing nurture
for children. Mothering has lost its uniqueness and goodness
in the eyes of society. This is apparent in the failure of current family law to give any special recognition to child nurture or to acknowledge those who provide such nurture. Instead, a mother who nurtures her child outside of a sexual
relationship with the child's father is considered deviant. To
correct such deviance, the woman must add a man, preferably the child's father, to the family. Such thinking sends the
powerful message that a family must have a man at its
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center. Children and their nurturers are not valuable except
in the context of a family that includes a man.
Fineman ends her discussion by proposing change which
is based on a newer feminist approach. This approach seeks
equality of value between men and women instead of merely
attempting to treat them alike. She proposes that society
must share the responsibility for nurturing children. We will
then assign the "gendered" responsibility for nurture to
"mothers," most of whom are women. As a society, we will
accept responsibility for the derived dependency of the
mother-child dyad through minimum levels of subsidy for
every caregiving dyad. Child nurture will no longer be based
upon the sexual relationship that exists between the child's
mother and father. Men who wish to be involved in child nurture and wish to provide for the nurturer-child dyad will negotiate their way into this arrangement by contract. There
will be no marriage as a legal entity. Instead, marriage will
become a private matter between a man and woman, and
child nurture will become a public matter concerning us all.
We have two fundamental criticisms of Fineman's proposals for redefining the family and ending legal marriage.
First of all, her radical redefinition of the family does not
achieve an appropriate balance among the needs of the father, mother, child, and society. Second, Fineman's discussion of how her proposals would work simply ignores what we
already know about the psychological and economic benefits
children gain from having two parents instead of one.
First, consider the issue of balancing rights and needs.
While Fineman may be correct in her assertion that "no fault"
divorce has not improved the situation of children and is unfair to women, this does not mean that we should abandon
fairness as a governing principle. As we see it, the unfairness
of the treatment of women and the inadequacy of economic
support and psychological nurture for children are the result
of the lack of consideration given to children in the development of family law. We propose that when family arrangements are made under current "no fault" law, all parties must
be required to take the best interests of the child into consideration. With this requirement, several results will follow. A
workable provision for the nurture and economic support of
the child will have to be made, thus assigning nurture a
value. Children will have the right to be nurtured and to con-
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tinue any nurturing relationships they have enjoyed and that
the nurturer wants to continue providing. Often, but not necessarily, both parents will be included as members of nurturing relationships. Other adults, who are "psychological parents," may be included as well. The right of children to be
nurtured will assign to society the duty of subsidizing the
caregiving dyads when private arrangements fail to do so.
The addition of a "best interest" test to the resolution of
disputes between divorcing or separating parents will not
eliminate the parental rights of either mother or father.
However, it should make parental rights subordinate to the
child's right to be nurtured and to continue nurturing relationships. The child's right to receive top priority in the balancing of competing interests arises out of the child's dependency and lesser ability to provide for his or her own needs.
But who is next in line after the child? The mother? The father? Society, with its duty to support the caregiving unit?
Here, we would accept some elements of Fineman's proposal.
These priorities should not be the subject of fixed legal
guidelines, but instead, should be made the subject of contractual arrangements. Where a child's mother and father
have shared nurturing duties and have maintained nurturing
intimate relationships with their child, equal claims to continuing these relationships can be acknowledged by the judicial process without resorting to the "no fault" solution of
treating men and women the same. The child's best interest
may be served if he or she remains primarily dependent on
the mother whose derived dependency must then be acknowledged with an order for the father to sustain the "caregiving
unit." The best interest test does not require either of the two
extreme solutions discussed above. It does not involve the
"neutered mother" and mindless solution of "no fault" law
and does not require, as Fineman suggests, that a father be
seen as irrelevant and society be seen as a supporter.
Having discussed our first concern that the child's rights
must be given first priority when balancing the needs of
mothers, fathers, and society, we turn now to our second concern regarding Fineman's analysis. Fineman simply ignores
all evidence supporting the proposition that children who
have relationships with their fathers have a better chance of
being successful in the enterprise of growing up than those
who lack these relationships. Children who have positive re-
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lationships with their fathers are more likely to develop a
sense of personal control over their lives, show less problem
behavior, achieve success in school, express satisfaction with
themselves and relate well to peers and other adults. These
successful developmental outcomes are not limited to children who have relationships with their fathers. They are
sometimes seen in the children of single mothers and lesbian
couples. Regardless, the fact that a father's involvement is
associated with greater psychological well-being and economic opportunity for their children requires a policy that encourages the involvement of men in the upbringing of their
children.
In addition to the benefits children gain from involvement with their fathers on an individual basis, there is a psychological benefit for children who are a part of a family in
which adults have a successful close relationship with one another. In such families, children develop greater faith in love
and its possibility in their own lives. We also know that
many father-child relationships are of poor quality and can,
at times, be destructive. Additionally, many marriages are
destructive in their effects on all parties concerned, including
the children. This is precisely why the analysis of Fineman's
question, "Who is a family?" or the related question "Who can
continue being a family after divorce or separation?" must be
approached from the perspective of the child's best interest.
Instead of assigning fixed rights and duties to the man,
woman, and society in disputes about child nurture, let us
begin with the child's need for nurture. We will most often
discover that while both the father and mother have some relationship with the child, the mother is the chief provider of
nurture and that she, as a result, is less able to provide autonomously for her and her child's support than she would be
if she were not the principal nurturer. Family law needs to
acknowledge the value to society of the mother's provision of
child nurture, and society must be the safety net for her derived dependency. At the same time, we must acknowledge
the value of the child's continuing relationship with his or her
father and with other persons who may be significant sources
of nurture. Economic arrangements for supporting dependents must reflect the value to society of child nurture wherever it occurs and in whatever amount.

1996] SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 483
We identify four criteria, at variance with Fineman's
analysis, that we believe public policy should meet regarding
the nurture of children. First, policy should not interfere
with a child's opportunity to have permanent, intimate, and
nurturing relationships with two or more parents (as in stepparents, significant partners of parents, etc.). While these relationships often do not develop, we should encourage any opportunity a child has to develop intimate relationships with
both parents. If we relegate the father's participation to the
private contractual sphere as Fineman proposes, the opportunity for many children to maintain relationships with their
fathers would be curtailed.
The second criterion family policy should meet is to explicitly recognize the child's right to have family relationships
and to be nurtured independently of the rights of other parties, the mother, father, and society. The third related criterion is that once the child's rights are identified, these rights
must be balanced with the rights of the father, mother, and
society.
The fourth criterion is that family law policy should explicitly recognize both the special "gendered" value of the
nurturing role which is often, but not always, taken by the
woman and the value of an ongoing, nurturing, and intimate
relationship with a second parent. Policy must give men incentives to maintain relationships with and continue to support their children. Children and society are ill served when
men are written off as unvalued participants in the family.
We agree with Fineman that the gendered experience of
being the primary nurturer is not recognized and valued
properly, as reflected by today's family law. As she eloquently argues, we need to back away from the equalitysameness quandary we have gotten ourselves into with regard to family law. We need to address the derived dependency issue and make a collective societal decision about
what we are willing to do to support caregiving dyads. The
current political climate will not support Fineman's proposal
for a societal subsidy of single-mother caregiving units. Fathers should be included along with parent education about
child care and job training as part of a complete package. An
additional aspect of our proposal would be to enforce all contractual agreements between parents that assign child care
duties to fathers. If we cannot enlist them, we must enlist
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society. Some welfare subsidy is necessary and must be continued. In short, let children and their needs drive the development of family law.

